INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS
FOR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY
NEWSLETTER NO. 31, NOVEMBER 2000
Geopolitical Stability as a condition of sustainable development of the Kaliningrad region
Eric Fawcett 1927-2000
Climate change, what way forward?
Time for a missile freeze
Reflection on Scheffrans article: Missile Freeze
A word from the chairman
The Nanterre Declaration
New INES members
The INES Newsletter
Editor Armin Tenner
Buziaustraat 18, 1068 KN Amsterdam, Netherlands
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AS A CONDITION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KALININGRAD REGION
Dr. Yuri Zverev works at the Geographical Faculty of Kaliningrad State University. The present article has been presented at the INES workshop "Regional Aspects of Sustainability and the Role of the Universities," held in Kaliningrad, Russia from September 29th to October 1st 2000.
Kaliningrad as a region has appeared on the map after the Second World War. During the conference of Potsdam in 1945, it was decided to give the city of Königsberg and the adjacent areas to the Soviet Union. In April 1946 the Königsberg region was formed and became part of the Russian Federation; on the 4th of June it was renamed after one of the Soviet leaders, Kalinin.
In August 1946 after a state decree, voluntary settling of the region by Soviet people took place. Most of them came from Central Russia and the Volga region, as well as from Soviet Byelorussia.
After about a year, on October 11th 1947, Stalin signed a secret decree #3547-1169c on resettlement of the German population of the Kaliningrad region to the Soviet occupation zone in post-war Germany. To carry out this order, as well as the next one, which came on November 15th 1948, 102,494 Germans were moved from the region. (Kostyashov, 1994).
After the eviction, the region remained closed for foreigners for a long time and functioned as a fairly common territory of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it was a kind of enclave, separated from the territory of Russia by other Soviet republics. Until a certain time this fact was not of great importance; the region developed into a part of the Soviet State. The inhabitants did not feel their unique position due to the existence of a free transit through the other republics, which were viewed upon as Soviet, though peculiar, territories.
The situation has radically changed by 1991. After Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have declared their independence and after the Soviet Union has collapsed, the Kaliningrad region turned into a Russian territory separated from the mainland by several foreign states.
Much more than that, by the end of the Cold war within the Baltic Sea region, in the center of which Kaliningrad is situated, the processes of economic and political cooperation and integration started to develop fairly intensively. The isolation from this integration is not in the interest of both the region and the state of Russia. For a sustainable development, the Kaliningrad region needs a stable geopolitical situation, as well as partnership and cooperation. The geopolitical situation around Kaliningrad is becoming complicated by the following factors:
First, despite the fact that all countries concerned recognize the region as a territory of Russia, "in private" there are discussions about schemes of the Kaliningrad future that contradict the status of Kaliningrad as a part of Russia. It is obvious that a separation is not likely to come true; still the very fact of the appearance of such variants worries the state of Russia. Of these possibilities we will list the following (Y. Zverev, 1998):
Secondly, the Kaliningrad region is located outside the basic massif of the Slavic-Orthodox civilization, to the west of the border of the spreading of Western Christianity by 1500 (according to S. Huntington). That means that the Kaliningrad region is locked inside the Western civilization and pretty close to the line of the cultural border. Such borders may become the object of main conflicts in future, though we suggest that such borders must become zones of political cooperation.
Thirdly, the interests of several geopolitical forces are concentrated on this region, those of Russia, the EU, Sweden, the USA, Germany, and NATO. As for Poland and Lithuania, they follow the direction given by NATO and the EU, so one may conclude that the policy of these countries towards the Kaliningrad region will be formulated neither in Warsaw, nor in Vilnius.
It is absolutely clear that the valuable part of the foreign countries interests towards Kaliningrad coincides with those of Russia and that this creates the opportunity for cooperation. However, sometimes we face suggestions as to recognize Kaliningrad de facto as a member of one European family and to cooperate actively with the region itself, not to that degree with Moscow (Pertti Jonniemi, Stephen Dewarr and Lyndelle D. Fairlie, 2000). Still one has to keep in mind that Kaliningrad is not a state, it is a part of Russia and it has no sense to negotiate about cooperation with the Kaliningrad region alone. The impression emerges that this is an attempt to softly separate Kaliningrad from Russia.
Among the factors worsening the geopolitical situation for the region it is necessary to mention the eastward expansion of NATO. Already at this moment, the Polish entry into NATO has led to a deterioration of the Russian-Polish relations (not by the initiative of Russia). Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe that a similar situation will arise in the case of Lithuanians entry into NATO. Especially, since a number of American strategists regard Lithuanians acceptance by NATO as a method of isolation of Kaliningrad. For example, in an Internet paper from Defense Systems Daily we read: "Since the Kaliningrad enclave cannot be liquidated, we assume, it must be isolated. Lithuania must be included in NATO" (1999).
On the contrary, the expansion of the EU is positively viewed upon in Russia. However, for the Kaliningrad region becoming a Russian enclave inside EU, not only new opportunities but also a lot of problems will be created. According to some Western authors negative results will prevail over the positive ones for Kaliningrad (I.Samson, V. Lamande, 2000).
For an efficient development of the Kaliningrad region in the European society, several problems must be solved:
First we have to solve the transport problem.
Kaliningrad requires at least free transit of cargoes through the border countries. There is a fear among the Kaliningrad citizens that without internationally guaranteed transit, all transport will go around the region due to customs and border problems. Transport is one of the priority tasks of the regional development and of all preferential terms connected with export-import.
Second, the visa problem arises.
The 1997 Amsterdam treaty, which became effective in 1999, suggests that countries entering the EU will sooner or later come to accept Shengen visa. After Lithuania and Poland become members of the EU, Kaliningrad citizens will have to get visas to travel to the rest of Russia. Customs rules and procedures have already been strengthened under the influence of the EU in the case of Poland. The Lithuanian entry into the EU will lead to the cancellation of the 1995 treaty on non-visa traveling to Lithuania for Kaliningrad inhabitants.
The third problem is the one of energy sources.
Nowadays, Kaliningrad gets its energy from Russia by transit through Lithuania, but in the nearest future Lithuania plans to separate itself from the Russian energy system. It is clear that we do not have enough time and money to reconstruct our own energy base.
The fourth problem is the one of priorities of economic development of the region.
The first vice-foreign minister Ivanov, who visited the region in February 2000, was quoted: "We have to know and understand clearly the position and the aim of the Kaliningrad region. Be it a transport region or an assembly place."
At the same time there is a considerable potential of cooperation between the Kaliningrad region and the states and region of the Baltic Sea. It is possible to suggest some spheres of possible cooperation:
It seems that the further progress of cooperation in these and other areas will allow the elimination of mutual suspicion and will construct stable geopolitical conditions for a sustainable development of the Kaliningrad region as an integral part of Russia and a relevant actor in the Baltic Sea Region.
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1927 - 2000
Born and brought up in Lancashire, England, Eric Fawcett obtained a PhD degree from Cambridge in experimental physics (of metals) in 1954. His dynamic career took him on to the National Research Council in Ottawa, the Royal Radar Establishment, Malvern, the Bell Telephone Labs, Murray Hill, New Jersey, and to the University of Toronto, where he was appointed Full Professor in 1970. From Toronto he made extended visits to at least thirteen other universities and institutes all over the world for the purpose of scientific collaboration. After retirement in 1993, his collaborative research received even more emphasis for several more years.
While Erics 150 excellent scientific papers are well known in his field internationally, he will be more widely remembered in Canada and elsewhere for his role in stimulating public consciousness of the dangers of war waged with weapons of mass destruction. He was at one time or another a participant in, or board member of at least ten peace organizations, including the International Network of Engineers and Scientists and the International Peace Bureau. He became a Pugwash participant in 1980. In 1981 Eric played the central role in founding Science for Peace, a nonprofit corporation registered in Ontario. He served as its first President (1981-4), as Vice-President (1990-2, 1997-8) and President (1995-7), and in various key roles all other years. Outstanding among the achievements of the Working Groups of Science for Peace in which he participated was the "Toronto Declaration," which set out general ethical considerations for scientific research. The Declaration has been widely circulated in Europe and helped some universities in Canada to formulate their ethical guidelines policies. He was also cofounder of the Canadian Committee of Scientists and Scholars, which has as its objective the defence and promotion the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Despite his extraordinary level of activity in the public domain since 1980 his scientific research continued undiminished. From the 1980s Eric extended his writing and editorial work into new fields. For instance, in 1994-5 he co-edited, with Hanna Newcombe, the important book, "United Nations Reform: Looking ahead after Fifty years" (Science for Peace, Dundurn series, 1995). Especially throughout the 1980s Eric kept in close contact with leading Jewish physicists who had been fired from their research institutes or universities in the Soviet Union, and were treated as dissidents by their government. He and others, at some risk to all concerned, helped these scholars to keep up with current research by organizing seminars in cramped apartments, knowing that KGB agents were constantly surveying all comings and goings. He was willing to participate in any conference that might reduce international tensions and/or lead to an abatement of the nuclear arms race, and he several times went to Moscow to that end.
After a valiant struggle with cancer this year, Eric died peacefully on 2 September. He is survived by his beloved wife, Pat, their three children and four grandsons.
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CLIMATE CHANGE - WHAT WAY FORWARD?
Martin Quick MA CEng MIMechE
Climate Change is now generally recognised as one of the greatest threats to the future of the planet both to people and to ecosystems. Although naturally occurring changes may be contributing part of the significant temperature increases that are now occurring, human activities are the major influence. In industrialised countries, which are the major source of greenhouse gases, the costs of coping with climate change will be huge, but it is in developing countries that the effects will have the most devastating effects. Because the main greenhouse gas, CO2 is an inevitable product of fossil fuel use, and energy from fossil fuels is central to the present state of development in most countries, resolving this issue will be more difficult than reducing or eliminating most other forms of pollution.
Already we have seen droughts in Sub-Saharan Africa and India, floods in India and Bangladesh, storms and hurricanes in Central and South America and the Caribbean and forest fires in South East Asia, all of which are consistent with the predicted effects of climate change. Potential conflicts over water supplies and shortages of fertile land are likely to be intensified by climate change effects. If greenhouse gas emissions are not drastically reduced, climate change could reach globally catastrophic levels, as positive feedback mechanisms occur, such as reduced polar ice cover reducing the proportion of solar radiation that is reflected back into space, the loss of forests and the thawing of permafrost in the tundra releasing methane.
This paper tries to explore some of the issues in a non-specialist way. Comments and views from people from countries at different stages of development would be welcomed, may be via INESnet.
Mechanisms agreed at Kyoto
At the Kyoto conference on climate change, reductions in emissions by most of the industrialised countries relative to a 1990 base line were agreed, to be achieved by about 2010. However, in relation to the size of emissions reductions said by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to be necessary to avoid catastrophic effects (a global reduction of the order of 60%), these reductions (averaging about 5%) were a very small first step. Also it was agreed that certain "mechanisms" should be set up to help implement measures to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. These mechanisms are Emissions Trading (ET), Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Emissions Trading allows industrialised countries to trade emissions quotas, the argument being made that this allows reductions in greenhouse gas emissions to be made in the most cost-effective way. There is opposition to ET being used on a large scale, based on worries that countries like the USA may do little to cut their own emissions and buy quotas from countries like Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union whose emissions have reduced significantly since the 1990 base-line date due to reduced industrial output, which would not result in any new reductions.
Joint Implementation allows industrialised countries to act jointly in implementing specific projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This could be valuable in the right circumstances, but it is important that projects do not have other adverse environmental consequences or social costs.
The Clean Development Mechanism allows industrialised countries to fund projects in developing countries which will reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Projects which also safeguard biodiversity and promote sustainable economic development by using local skills would be particularly valuable. Reforestation and creating new forests are not currently favoured in the CDM because of doubts about the net greenhouse gas emissions when the forests reach maturity. However, given that forest maintenance and reforestation are among the most cost-effective means of sequestration (locking up) of carbon, so long as issues of bio-diversity and benefits to the local population are acceptable and if there are plans for maintaining the areas as a net reducer of greenhouse gases in the long term, there is a case for including these in the CDM.
Contract and Converge
It would seem that Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism could be effective and equitable if they are used in conjunction of a set of emissions limits that "Contract and Converge," applicable to all countries. Thus, an overall global limit would be set in terms of greenhouse gas emissions per head of population, which progressively reduces at a rate which would avoid catastrophic climate change effects, and individual countries quotas would converge towards this level. There might have to be some allowance in the quotas to allow for major differences in climate that require large differences in energy use to achieve acceptable conditions for occupants of buildings. In the longer term, the different mechanisms ET, JI and CDM might tend to merge.
In such a scenario, countries which currently are energy profligate and emit many times the current world average of greenhouse gases would have to reduce their emissions quite rapidly. Countries which now have very low emissions would have quotas which would at least initially rise above their current level of emissions. This would allow for development in these counties making efficient use of some fossil fuels, or for quotas to be traded for money which could fund sustainable development.
In the Kyoto negotiations which agreed greenhouse gas emissions targets for industrialised nations, some countries such as Australia negotiated an increase in emissions. This would be unacceptable in any longer term agreement. Emissions trading would allow the environmental costs and consumer benefits from energy intensive manufacturing (e.g. steel production) to be compensated for, with the costs of goods with a high embodied energy reflecting the tradable value of carbon emissions. This should ease the acceptance of equable quotas by countries with energy intensive industries.
Aviation, one of the fastest growing energy use sectors, currently escapes all fuel duties. Greenhouse effects associated with aviation at very high altitudes are considerably more than that from burning the same amount of fuel nearer ground level. These emissions should be costed at an appropriate rate, but emissions trading could ensure the costs are met by the users, irrespective of the country in which the airline is based.
Routes to a low-carbon economy
For any given global limit of greenhouse gas emissions (dominated by CO2), there will be a mix (or a number of mixes) of energy conservation measures and different fossil fuels and non-fossil energy sources which will meet the worlds energy needs. As the limit is reduced, the proportion of non-fossil sources will have to increase and those of high carbon content will need to decrease. Initially, renewable sources which are lowest in cost will be used. However, as the renewable energy requirement increases, more expensive sources would need to be used, which would be reflected in an increased trading price of carbon emissions.
Under an international regime of emissions trading and Contract and Converge, each country would be free to decide how to meet its emissions target. If taxes on fossil are used to limit fossil fuel consumption both by encouraging more efficient energy use and to pay for the amount of renewable energy needed to achieve the required emissions target (at least while renewable energy costs are higher than fossil fuels), those countries using less energy per capita would require lower levels of tax.
The technological development of efficient transmission of electricity over very long distances at ultra high voltages could enable countries with less potential for renewables to buy in renewable energy. For example, Northern European countries might be able to import solar generated electricity from countries in the Middle East or North Africa, allowing these countries a potential source of income to replace some of their oil revenues. Photovoltaic panels will probably continue to be made in a limited number of high technology factories, but they are readily transportable, and some of the associated equipment for producing solar power, which makes up a significant part of the overall cost, may be produced locally. Recent developments indicating the feasibility of electricity storage on a moderately big scale may also improve the potential for renewable sources with variable output. Because of the huge quantity of solar energy reaching the earth, in the ultimate, an upper limit to energy costs would be set by the cost of energy from the sun, however big the proportion needed from renewable sources to meet our CO2 targets.
Wealthy countries routes to much reduced emissions would be likely to emphasise efforts to limit transport growth together with advanced technologies for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Developing countries would also have access to these technologies where appropriate, but also could exploit indigenous skills and technologies in a way which would give savings in emissions at lower costs than would be possible in industrialised countries. For example, in hot countries, traditional buildings and the layout of settlements have been effective at providing a tolerable environment without use of energy consuming air-conditioning. Some traditional building methods in both tropical and temperate countries have not required the use of large quantities of cement, with its high greenhouse gas emissions. In some developing countries, wind turbines and more efficient cooking stoves are manufactured locally, both reducing the use of unsustainable energy resources. Also, countries which have not gone to the extremes of urban sprawl as exemplified by most cities in the USA could more readily plan for less dependence on car use.
Potential for reduced greenhouse gas emissions
As well as CO2, there are other significant greenhouse gases, including nitrous oxide and methane. Emissions of these from the industrial and energy producing sectors can be reduced significantly by better use of technology, but emissions from agriculture (particularly methane from rice production) may be more difficult to reduce. Emissions trading and Joint Implementation projects could benefit countries like Russia where there are extensive methane emissions from gas production and pipelines.
For CO2, developments such as much more efficient vehicles, the use of fuel cells as part of a "hydrogen economy," the potential for much more energy efficient buildings in many countries and solar cooling of buildings all appear to give the potential for more rapid reductions in fossil fuel use than has been assumed in many climate change scenarios. Also, the cost of many types of renewables is predicted to fall with increasing levels of production, particularly photo-voltaics.
In addition, as oil resources become severely depleted, which some experts predict will happen within less than 30 years, the price of oil will rise steeply, creating an opportunity, especially in transport, for alternative energy sources. Indeed it can be inferred from a recent study done for the European Union that bio-ethanol which can be produced in many climatic regions could be competitive with petroleum motor fuels from crude oil at the present (October 2000) price of ~$30 per barrel. However, conventional oil sources should not replaced by oil from shale or tar sands, or derived from coal.
The potential for reducing emissions by re-optimisation of all activities in line with higher energy costs seem huge. Thus, present manufacturing processes often involve transportation of materials and components over huge distances to exploit small savings in costs in different countries or regions. This would be expected to reduce. Tele-working and tele conferencing could reduce the need for work-related travel.
The area where there appears to be the least potential for alternative energy sources to drastically reduce greenhouse effects is aviation. In addition to CO2, high altitude flying produces water vapour and condensation trails which act as greenhouse gases, and it would seem that these would still be produced even if the fuel were derived from renewable sources. Thus the aviation industry may find itself having to buy emissions quotas which will fund major greenhouse gas reductions in other sectors.
In addition to sequestration of carbon through forestry, as mentioned above, there are schemes being developed for extracting CO2 from the flue gases from power stations or at other points in the energy production cycle, and sequestering it in deep rock formations or at great depth in the ocean. Also, it has been proposed to "seed" areas of the seas with nutrients, primarily iron, to encourage massive plankton growth as a means of absorbing CO2. There are significant doubts about ocean sequestering. It is better to reduce fossil fuel use than to rely on uncertain schemes for sequestration of CO2.
To minimise the loss of soil fertility, particularly in areas affected by harsher climate conditions, maximising the use of organic nutrients and humus in the soil would be beneficial. Thus, planning to maximise the potential for composting by recycling organic matter is needed.
In addition to the technical advances which could lead to much lower greenhouse gas emissions, people in wealthy countries will need to adopt a life style much less dependent on profligate use of energy and unlimited travel, espcecially air travel.
INES role in climate change activities
Since the Kyoto conference there have been a number of meetings to work out the details of how the emissions reduction commitments should be achieved, the latest conference being in the Netherlands in November 2000. Organisations like INES whose objectives include equity, reduction of conflicts as well as the protection of the environment should be pressing for much greater reductions than those agreed at Kyoto, achieved in a way which is equitable. The case could be made that, if it is claimed by industrialised nations that emissions trading is a lower cost means of achieving emissions reductions, such trading would only be acceptable on a large scale in the context of converging and contracting greenhouse gas quotas. The target should be to reach fairly rapidly a per-capita level which would significantly reduce the risks of climate change. A fair emissions trading system could be a significant aid to development in poorer countries.
It is frustrating to engineers and scientists who can see good and practical ways forward to reducing greenhouse gas emissions often in ways that also have economic benefits, to see politicians being reluctant to meet the challenge. Efforts to protect the future for all the worlds children and grandchildren could well give a real objective for many people whose lives seem currently to be lacking in clear motivation.
Martin Quick studied engineering at Cambridge University, and worked most of his professional life in the electricity supply industry, and now does a small amount of energy consultancy, mainly on the energy efficiency of residential buildings. He is Vice-Chair and energy coordinator of Architects and Engineers for Social Responsibility (AESR) in the UK.
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Time for a Missile Freeze
Options for international control of ballistic missiles
While there is an intense debate on the technical feasibility and the security implications of the US National Missile Defense (NMD) program, the non-proliferation and disarmament of ballistic missiles has been largely neglected. This article discusses options for preventing an arms race by improving the international control and disarmament of ballistic missiles.
Dangers of a missile arms race
Since ballistic missiles were first used by Germany in World War II, missile proliferation has been of great concern to many nations. Ballistic missiles allow aggressors to strike distant targets quickly, with little warning, and with a high probability of penetration. They played a destabilizing role and wasted enormous resources during the Cold War. Grave concerns have been raised about the spread of ballistic missile systems and technologies, in particular, to the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The use of ballistic missiles in the two Gulf Wars demonstrated their political significance in regional conflicts, though their military utility is rather questionable. Altogether there are good arguments why a world with less or no ballistic missiles would be a better place.
While the enormous Cold-War missile arsenals have declined, the government of the United States perceives new threats from emerging missile capabilities in the so-called "rogue states (Iraq, Iran, North Korea) which now transformed into "states of concern." While the substance of this threat is still doubted by many experts, influential political circles in the USA promote the early deployment of NMD. Opponents argue that such a system could be easily countered by countermeasures, would undermine international stability and may even increase the missile threat.
The current missile control regime is insufficient
There is still time to prevent a destabilizing and costly arms race between offensive and defensive missiles, assuming that the development of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is a time-consuming and complex task and NMD deployment would be delayed by technical difficulties (especially after the failure of the July 7 test).
In the past, ballistic missiles have been largely ignored in international arms control and disarmament negotiations, although the preamble of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) demands "the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery." In his speech to the House of Commons in London on July 3 Jayantha Dhanapala, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, raised the question, "why is public debate mired today in a duel between deterrence and defence, with scant attention to missile disarmament?"
Previous efforts have focused on export control by the major suppliers of missile technology and bilateral arms control and disarmament of the former superpowers (INF Treaty, START Treaties). The current restrictions on the transfer of missile-related technology are embodied in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), created by the G-7 States in 1987. Although membership has grown from 7 to 28 countries and some missile programs could be delayed, the effectiveness of the regime is limited by fundamental problems and shortcomings. The MTCR is a voluntary, non-binding agreement with restricted membership. It does not address the already existing ballistic missile arsenals, and ignores the asymmetry between "haves" and "have-nots." Various shorter-range missiles are already deployed in developing countries, and the MTCR has no specific verification and enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, rigid export control of dual-use goods impedes civil technology cooperation.
To improve the present control regime, a few countries had made preliminary proposals within the limits of the MTCR. At an MTCR meeting in Paris April 23-24, 2000 the United States, Britain, and France offered steps to reinforce MTCR export controls by an increased dialogue with non-MTCR parties, pre-launch notification for missile and space launches, and international standards in the missile field. The proposals will be discussed at a meeting in September to prepare for the MTCR October 2000 plenary session.
New political initiatives
Some governmental levels are now considering options for a stronger missile non-proliferation regime as an alternative to missile defense. The former Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the June 1999 G-8 summit in Germany proposed a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS). In his statement at the NPT 2000 Conference on April 25, the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov urged consideration of a Russian proposal for a global missile confidence building and non-proliferation regime. The GCS proposal was discussed March 16 at an expert-level meeting in Moscow, attended by representatives from 46 countries and the United Nations, including Iran and large delegations from China, India, and Egypt. The United States sent an observer but did not participate.
A goal of the GCS is to increase transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding. Nations would be required to provide notification of missile or space-launch vehicle (SLV) test-launches. To discourage proliferation, the GCS would offer incentives to members of the regime that forswore the use of missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction, including security assurances against the use of missile systems, assistance from the UN Security Council if such weapons were used, and assistance in the peaceful uses of space for members that gave up missiles as weapons. Despite strong criticism, US officials expressed interest in discussion of the GCS. The Russian government has stated its intention to open the proposal for debate at the "millennium session" of the UN General Assembly.
The GCS proposal is valuable in opening the international debate on missile control, but still is confined to a rather narrow non-proliferation regime, comparable in some respects with the NPT but without the disarmament obligation of Article VI. In this form it would be improbable that major developing countries would accept another "discriminatory" regime with the five declared nuclear weapon states as the only missile powers. If, however, all of the current missile owners would be allowed to keep their missile arsenals, then the effectiveness of the regime would be severely limited.
The only way to deal with asymmetries between countries would be the creation of an international norm against ballistic missiles that would leave the same rights to any country. As the Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy explained in his speech at the 2000 NPT Review Conference on April 25, "there exists no treaty, no code of conduct, no set of guidelines defining responsible behavior in these areas. This is a matter that must be addressed."
On March 30-31, 2000, ballistic missiles experts from Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Russia, and the United States met with Axworthy for a roundtable in Ottawa to examine options of a multilateral approach to more effective ballistic missile control, international monitoring, and early warning. First priority would be the public defense of the value and need for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which should be expanded and strengthened. To prevent instabilities and accidents, risk-reduction and confidence-building measures could be taken, such as de-alerting, improved ballistic missile early warning and launch notification. The concept of no-first use could be extended to ballistic missiles. The monitoring and surveillance of missile and space-related activities and the exchange of technical data would be the key to building a verification system of missile control.
The link between space and missile control was seen as crucial. The experts suggested to negotiate and clarify multilateral space regulations and reserve the use of space for commercial rather than military uses. Steps into this direction would be the establishment of a Canberra-style commission on "Cooperative Security in Space," expert meetings on space surveillance and regulations, and the involvement of the commercial space business.
It was suggested that Canada should play a lead role in elaborating a multilateral action plan on ballistic missiles, e.g. by including key NATO countries. Russia and China should be involved in multilateral cooperation, addressing their broader security concerns. For the long-term success of a missile control regime it would important to "de-rogue" relations with countries such as North Korea and Iran and better understand their reasons for pursuing their missile programs. Recent political developments in these two countries have been rather positive in this respect (to mention the North-South-Korean summit). This clearly shows that the chances for a new missile control regime would be best served by creating regional security environments that reduce the demand for ballistic missiles.
International organizations would play an important role in facilitating such a process. Potential fora to discuss and negotiate multilateral missile control would be a conference of the MTCR member states and the UN Committee on Disarmament. Alternatively, an international conference of the crucial countries with ballistic missile capabilities could be considered.
Missile ban and missile freeze - two sides of one coin
According to the Ottawa expert group, the long-term goals include "demilitarization, the elimination of non-civilian ballistic missiles, and the elimination of nuclear weapons." While the report did not go into details about how these goals might be achieved, some experts referred to the Reykjavik talks of Gorbachev and Reagan in 1986 and proposals made by independent researchers. A model for the elimination of ballistic missiles is the ZBM (Zero Ballistic Missile) regime which has been developed and discussed by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in 1992, with Paul Nitze and Alton Frye as strong supporters.
Such a regime would aim at the complete elimination of offensive ballistic missiles and combine unilateral declarations with regional and global multilateral agreements. The ZBM proposal suggested a step-by-step approach, including bilateral cuts between the USA and Russia, ballistic missile-free zones, an international Missile Conference, the creation of an International Agency for Ballistic Missile Disarmament, and finally agreement on the varying schedules to zero ballistic missile capability. To implement ballistic missile elimination, the FAS proposal presented a complete draft treaty. Such a Ballistic Missile Convention would aim for the global non-proliferation and elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, in conjunction with conventions on the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.
While global missile disarmament would be a longer-term perspective, the need for action is now. The best way to prevent an arms race and buy more time for political initiatives would be a moratorium on the further development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles. Such a "missile freeze" would be like a break in the arms race, during which countries could consider and negotiate the next steps without time pressure. A key element would be a ballistic missile flight test ban which would preclude the testing of new missiles and reduce the chance of accidental or intentional war. To address concerns about asymmetries and discrimination, a test ban moratorium would have a contemporary character and would need to be accompanied by negotiations on missile reductions. To minimize incentives for missile development, the missile freeze should be extended to missile defense systems. Regional security initiatives, including the whole range of delivery systems, could help to overcome asymmetries.
Verification of missile disarmament
A crucial aspect of missile control would be the verification. Most important would be measures to prevent the transformation of space launch technology into ballistic missiles. Despite their inherent similarity, differences in the basing mode, the testing procedures, the payload, flight trajectory, guidance systems and reentry could be used as indicators to distinguish between space launchers and ballistic missiles. During testing, production and deployment, national technical means of verification (sensors, intelligence) would focus on observable rocket characteristics (number, size, range, payload, deployment mode, launch preparations, flight trajectory). Most visible is the infrastructure, which includes production facilities, development programs and test ranges, tracking and communication facilities, missile containers and missile-carrying vehicles. A ballistic missile flight test ban would be not very difficult to verify since missile launches are visible from early warning satellites and ground- or air-based radars.
To limit the risk of using space launchers for ballistic missile development, technical means of verification need to be combined with measures of cooperative verification and confidence building. Most important would be inspections, using non-intrusive devices and techniques, to detect reliably evidence of non-compliance and help provide assurance that no military ballistic missiles are being developed under a civilian space program. A safeguards system for space launchers could place some of the "most critical" items under supervision by an international organization. International cooperation in civilian space programs would be also important in containing the use of space technology for missile development.
The role of citizens and the public
Similar to nuclear disarmament, citizens and non-governmental organizations would play an important role in promoting and implementing international missile control. To increase public awareness a greater public discourse on the missile problem and its resolution is needed. By building a network of information exchange and debate, experts, civil society and officials would be jointly engaged in this process. Activities could include meetings and conferences, together with scientists and technicians, as well as protesting and citizen inspections of critical facilities. Only by such a joint endeavor there is a chance that ballistic missiles do not stimulate a new arms race and undermine the prospects for nuclear disarmament.
 M. Rice, Russia Proposes Global Regime On Missile Proliferation, Arms Control Today, May 2000.
 Ballistic Missiles Foreign Experts Roundtable Report, March 30-31, 2000, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, April 7, 2000.
 Revisiting Zero Ballistic Missiles - Reagans Forgotten Dream, F.A.S. Public Interest Report, May/June 1992; L. Lumpe, Zero Ballistic Missiles and the Third World, Arms Control, Vol. 14 (1), April 1993, pp. 218-223; A. Frye, Zero Ballistic Missiles, Foreign Policy, No. 88, Fall 1992, pp. 12-17.
 See further: J. Scheffran, Verification of Ballistic Missile Bans and Monitoring of Space Launches, in: W. Liebert, J. Scheffran (eds.), Against Proliferation - Towards General Disarmament, Münster: Agenda 1995, pp. 156-164; J. Scheffran, Elimination of Ballistic Missiles: An Important Step Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, in: J. Rotblat, M. Konuma (eds.), Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, World Scientific, 1997, pp. 310-326.
Dr. Jürgen Scheffran is physicist and a senior researcher at the interdisciplinary research group IANUS of the Technical Unversity Darmstadt, Germany. He is co-founder of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and Editor of the INESAP Information Bulletin. He worked as co-author of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention and joined the Ottawa expert group mentioned in this article. This paper has been prepared for the ECAAR Newsletter.
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Reflection on Scheffrans Article: Missile Freeze
We totally support the campaign to halt US project to build NMD which claims the threats leveled at US by the rogue states is the justification for US plans. Apart from the fact that there is no ground for such a claim, the latest development of US relations with them proof that many political options are available.
1. Scheffrans Article "Missile Freeze" speaks about two projects to prevent NBD. He is in favour of a project to freeze missile tests, production and deployment as a step towards zero ballistic missile option. Clearly, this project goes far beyond the Soviet proposal to build up a Global Control System for Missile Non-Proliferation and Missile Technology. In other words, missiles, according to the Russian proposal will be maintained, and the target is to halt missile proliferation and technology including NMD. Scheffran correctly said it is "confined to a rather narrow non-proliferation regime comparable in some respect with NPT, but without the disarmament obligation of article VI."
On the other hand main points should be stressed in connection to the feasibility of the zero ballistic missile option to halt NMD.
It goes without saying that this project is very much in line with our campaigns for disarmament and peace. But a question can be raised: Will those who are striving in US for NMD accept to postpone the implementation of their project until NWSs agree to abolish all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems? What we need is to prevent the implementation of US project now or in the next few months. Freezing missiles as a step towards zero ballistic missile should be on our agenda and all related ideas in Scheffrans article must be elaborated to this end (please do it Scheffran). It could be added as an independent point to the eleven points of the 1995 Statement of Abolition 2000. But it cannot be the feasible response to prevent NBM. On the contrary, preventing NBM could be a preamble to achieve zero ballistic missile.
Both Republican and democratic parties already endorsed NBM. It was not by accident that Clinton had selected Cohen, one of the most Republican ardent proponent of NBM to be Secretary of Defense in his Democratic Administration, while Bush will enthusiastically go NBM and violate ABM Treaty if he will be elected president. NBM and the colossal amount of money to be allocated for the implementation of the system will be a major asset to both US military and corporations, the two main pillars of the current US establishment. They have every intention to do it now and all efforts of civil societies worldwide should be made to prevent their designs. Therefore we cannot wait until NWSs agree to renounce their cherished nukes and missiles, a matter which will happen in the far future.
Now, we may return to the Russian proposal which is very ambiguous and full of flaws, particularly on the question of Theater Missile Defense (TMD).
2. The position of Russia on TMD is very disturbing. Both TMD and NMD have the same functions, the former are regional (targeted against non-strategic missiles) and the latter are global (against strategic missiles). But Russia has been always in favour for TMD to counter future threats from countries (or nationalities) hostile to its policy. It even encouraged US to build up portable TMD (read two articles by the Russian Arbatov and the US Senator Cohen, now Secretary of Defense, UN Disarmament Periodical, No. 1,1992).
Talks between Russia and US on TMD reached its climax when they concluded an agreement which allows the establishment of the system at a Summit Meeting between Yeltsin and Clinton in Helsinki, 21, March, 1997. The agreement allows velocity of TMD missile to reach five Km/sec and its range to 3500 Kilometers. It also permits the deployment of TMD on land, in air and on naval units. The only condition imposed on TMD operation is not to intercept intercontinental strategic missiles. This agreement goes very far beyond what had been allowed by ABM Treaty on the very limit deployment of anti ballistic missile systems.
At the same time, Russia has been firmly against NMD which will be targeted against its intercontinental strategic missiles and thus, will violate the anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). It will destabilize the strategic parity of both countries nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in favour of US. Therefore, Russia now, is threatening to halt negotiations in all fields of disarmament if US will go NMD.
But, recently the question of TMD has emerged in new context. It will not be only targeted to kill missiles of adversary countries such as Iran or North Korea, be will be also targeted against China. US has plans to build up TMD in Taiwan and Chinese missiles will be neutralized while those of US and its allies will be left intact and ready to attack. Also, US-NMD will gravely affect the Chinese missiles capabilities. Thus, China will be obliged to initiate a new wave of arms race to compensate for the missiles which will be killed by US NMD and Taiwan TMD.
Consequently, China has also threatened to refrain from negotiations in certain (not all) disarmament areas directly affected by US plans. An important point should be noted in this connection. Whereas Russia has totally supported TMD, Chinese opposition to TMD, according to Chinas declarations, only focused on the Taiwan TMD. The positions of both countries on NMD and TMD, particularly those of Russia, are confined to their national interests and limited to serve them.
3. Two threats NGOs are facing at present. US threats to build NMD and TMD, violating ABM and destabilizing the current balance of nuclear deployment and Russias threats (partially China) to put an end to all negotiations on disarmament conventional and non-conventional. Consequently, several former disarmament agreements may also collapse. A grave crisis is emerging and NGOs and many governments express concerns. Forces are coming together to launch a major campaign to prevent NMD and the Taiwan TMD, while experts are discussing alternatives. Two of them are presented by Scheffrans article.
But, what about TMDs which US may establish in many other regions with the Russian consent? Already US built TMD in Israel, the Arrow system, in order to kill missiles of its adversaries. Actually, the proliferation of missiles in the Middle East which triggers "grave concerns" according to Scheffrans article is directly due to US and Israeli policies themselves. Among them is US plan to kill missiles of the countries of the region by building TMD in Israel while those of the later will be free to attack, and its Counter Proliferation policy to prevent by force any country of the region, except Israel, which may attempt to acquire missiles or weapons of mass destruction to simply counter those of Israel.
Moreover, US is now developing missile "defense" technology to produce portable TMD. Such a step can be executed on land to enhance and broaden the areas of TMD operations, or on naval units to support operations of US Rapid Deployment Force against any country in any region which may threaten the so-called US "vital interests."
According to the position of Russia on the question of US missile "defense" systems, TMD can be freely established in any country and in international waters. Its main concern is only focused on NMD and the Taiwan TMD. But the principle of the Indivisibility of Peace must be firmly maintained. Therefore the Global Control system for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology which Russia is proposing must seek the prevention of both NMD and TMD.
4. In our modern civilization controlled by economic liberalization, free markets and transnational corporations there are poor souls and very precious souls, a distribution between the have-nots and the haves. Such discrimination should not be accepted and should be resisted. This is the rational for the just demand to abolish both NMD and TMD without discrimination.
5. Already the international community is alarmed and ready to act against NMD. But what about TMD? Few days ago several NGOs representatives informally gathered in Cairo and US-TMD built in Israel was under discussion. Many questions were raised: Why this issue has been dropped from the agenda of the international community? Shall we also threaten like others in order to alert the international community, governmental and non-governmental? We have our pressure cards. Fifteen states or more, members of the Arab League of States can threaten to withdraw from NPT if the TMD in Israel will not be abolished. Possibly the entire non-proliferation regime will collapse. But whom are we threatening? Whom the Russian rulers have been threatening? Practically the threats are not leveled at the real perpetrators of the crime who wants to reverse the process of disarmament. Unintentionally, the threats are leveled at the process of peace and disarmament itself.
Let us stop threatening. Let us bring our forces together, governmental and non-governmental, to prevent NMD and TMD. And if US start the implementation let us double and redouble our efforts. We did it before and we can succeed once more. And once we achieve this target the doors will be opened to take more steps towards zero ballistic missile, the option which we together with Scheffran are favouring.
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A word from the chairman
Again, in the last months of this year, a strong stress lay on the political issues of non-proliferantion and peacekeeping and on the planned project of a National Missile Defense in the US. In this issue of the Newsletter, various contributions are devoted to these subjects. Conferences were held in Aachen in September and in Moscow in October. In addition, we attended the conference of the International Peace Bureau (IPB) of which INES is a member in Nanterre / Paris. The final declaration of this conference is found on the last page of this Newsletter. Soon, new conferences will be announced for the coming year.
On the other hand, activity was going on in the field of sustainability, as also reflected by this Newsletter. The INES workshop "Regional Aspects of Sustainability and the Role of the Universities," held at the end of September in Kaliningrad, Russia, brought representatives of Eastern and Western Europe together and opened new possibilities of activity for INES and new fields of interest, as reflected by the leading paper of this Newsletter.
With deep sorrow we remember the death of Eric Fawcett in early September. He was one of the most active members of INES and excelled by his strong opinion and never-ending criticism of politics and the excesses of society. The readers of the INESnet messages will miss his nearly daily contributions. We must see how, after his death, we can keep our connection to the "Science for Peace" movement in his spirit.
Armin Tenner, 11 November 2000
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THE NANTERRE DECLARATION
As we meet in Paris today, we hear the cries of joy from the people who achieved a non-violent revolution in Serbia; we hear the cries of pain and sorrow of the people of the Middle East; we hear the cries of hope from the people of East Timor; we hear the cries for help from the people from Sierre Leone; Guinea, Colombia and elsewhere.
We share both the joys and the sorrows. The lesson we draw from these dramatic events is clear.
Peace and justice are inextricably entwined.
Today we are alarmed and saddened at the escalating violence in the Middle East. We fully support the initiative of Kofi Annan to achieve a cessation of hostilities. We call for the United Nations Security Council to assume its rightful role in the peace process We call for urgent compliance with UN resolutions pertaining to Palestinian rights. We call for support for the peace movement in Israel and all efforts to bring Palestinian and Israeli people together in peace with justice.
A better world tomorrow means we must lay down our arms, promote a culture of peace and put an end to the globalization of war. We need a global peace regime which involves the active participation of civil society with governments and international organizations. We oppose the globalization of the economy which has caused more poverty and suffering and increased the likelihood of debilitating conflicts of all kinds.
In this regard we congratulate those, mainly young, people the world over who through their endeavours have focused global attention on the negative effects that have arisen. This is a globalization from above, of and for elites. We want a globalization from below that benefits all of humanity, that respects cultural diversities and eliminates social and economic inequalities.
We believe people can and will make a difference. We call on citizens everywhere to :
This means encouraging all activities that help bring about an ever stronger culture of democracy, greater popular empowerment, gender equality, non-violence and peace education.
Let us work together for the globalization of peace and social justice!
"The Globalization of Peace" was the title of the triannual Conference of the International Peace Bureau (IPB) in Nanterre, Paris, on 12-14 October.
The "Nanterre Declaration" was issued at the end of this Conference. A highlight of the plenary sessions was the presentation of Achim Vanaik from India, who together with Praful Bidway received the MacBride Prize of IPB at the Conference. Praful Bidwai was an invited speaker at the INES 2000 Conference in Stockholm.
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