NEWSLETTER NO. 37
OO The nuclear issue after the Posture Review, Joseph Rotblat
OO INES statement on Nuclear Dangers
OO Liberty for Grigorij Pasko
OO New security challenges, David Krieger
OO Reiner Braun leaves the INES office, Armin Tenner
OO Demands for a peaceful and sustainable Africa
OO Report on the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, David Hay-Edie
OO The INES Special Projects Fund
OO The restoration of the Earth
OO 81st FECS conference on chemistry
OO Cyberwar, Netwar and the revolution in military affairs
OO Book announcement
OO Science and Environmental Health Network (SEHN)
OO The INES Executive Committee
THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AFTER THE POSTURE REVIEW
We have to look reality in its ugly face. The drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons is not going well; indeed, it is going very badly. The campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons, pursued by INES, Pugwash and many other organizations, has not only come to a halt, but the use of these weapons may become a routine part of military strategy, according to the recently disclosed Nuclear Posture Review.
What is all the more worrying is the loss of support from the general public. This is evident, for example, from the results of a public opinion poll in the UK, which has been conducted systematically, every month, for the last 20 years. The graph presents the combined response to two questions: (1) What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today? (2) What do you see as other important issues facing Britain today? At one time, over 40 per cent put nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapons as the most important issues, but the percentage of such answers decreased rapidly, and ever since the end of the Cold War has remained very low, at about 1 per cent. I do not have corresponding statistics for other countries, but from various indicators it would appear that the response in the US would be similar. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the great majority of the people came to the belief that either the nuclear threat has disappeared altogether, or that the deterrent effect of existing nuclear arsenals will take care of the threat. Neither of these beliefs is justified, as should be obvious today, when two nuclear powers are poised for a military showdown over Kashmir.
To me the situation is reminiscent of that I experienced 40 years ago, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I do hope that, like that crisis, it will be resolved without a nuclear exchange. Should such a nuclear exchange happen, however, with the inevitable immense loss of life, hundreds of thousands, millions perhaps, there would be such an upsurge of public opinion, that an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons would soon be reached.
My question is, why, oh why, do we have to wait for such a disaster to actually happen? Why could we not use our imagination, to take these steps now, to prevent it happening?
Clearly, we have not succeeded in putting this over to the public. I do not wish to diminish the past achievements of anti-nuclear organizations. Although it is impossible to provide concrete proof, I am convinced that these organizations deserve some credit for the fact that a nuclear war has been avoided so far. Mikhail Gorbachev told us so directly, but we cannot rest on past successes. Our job has not been done; and, although the prospects are bleak, we must pick ourselves up and resume our campaign for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this paper I am urging the renewal of a mass campaign, and I propose that it be based mainly on judicial and moral principles.
The revelations in the Nuclear Posture Review shocked us: it abandons the previous doctrine of nuclear weapons being viewed as weapons of last resort, and spells out a strategy which incorporates nuclear capability into conventional war planning. It is a major and dangerous shift in the whole rationale for nuclear weapons.
Actually, the revelations in the NPR should not have come as such a surprise. They are obviously much influenced by the events of September 11th, but in reality they are an egregious expression of the policy that has been pursued covertly by the United States ever since, or even before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in contradiction to the official line of pursuing nuclear disarmament.
At the core of this duplicitous and hypocritical policy is the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Ironically, it was introduced by the scientists who initiated the atom bomb project.
The scientists in the UK who initiated the research - myself among them — were humanitarian scientists: we pursued scientific research for its own sake but with the underlying expectation that it would be used for the benefit of humankind. The thought of working on a weapon of mass destruction would have been abhorrent to us in normal circumstances. But the circumstances were not normal: we knew that a war was imminent, a war between democracy and the worst type of totalitarianism, and we were afraid that it the bomb could be made, and was developed in Germany, it would enable Hitler to win the war and impose on the world the evil Nazi regime. At the time we thought that the only way to prevent this happening would be for us — the Western Allies — also to have the bomb and threaten its use in retaliation. I developed the concept of nuclear deterrence in the summer of 1939, even before the start of World War II.
It took me a little while to appreciate the fallacy of the deterrence concept. Our aim was to prevent the use of the atom bomb by anybody; we hoped that the threat of using it in retaliation would do the trick. This might have worked with a rational leader, but Hitler was not rational. I am convinced, though cannot prove it, that if Hitler had had the bomb, the last order from his bunker in Berlin, would have been to drop it on London, in the full knowledge that this would bring terrible retribution upon Germany. This would have been in the spirit of his philosophy of Götterdämmerung.
As it happened, this thesis was never put to the test: Hitler was defeated by conventional weapons, before the atom bomb was manufactured in the United States. But the fact remains that the concept of nuclear deterrence was used from the very beginning, and has been with us ever since. Its variant, extended deterrence, i.e. the threat to use nuclear weapons even against a non-nuclear attack, is — in my opinion — the greatest obstacle to the abolition of nuclear weapons.
By July 1945, when the first bomb was ready for testing, many scientists who initiated the Project were strongly opposed, on moral grounds, to the use of the bomb on civilian populations. They used this moral argument in their petitions to the US President and government.
The petitions were rejected. The politicians and the military leaders had their own ideas about the bomb; moral scruples hardly figured in them. The desire to bring the war to an end was undoubtedly an important factor, but perhaps even more important was to demonstrate to the world — and, particularly, to the Soviet Union — the newly acquired military might of the United States, and this required such use of the bomb that would utilize its devastating power to the maximum effect.
That the Soviet Union was thought of as the main enemy became evident soon after the end of the War, but I personally happened to find this out much earlier, directly from the mouth of General Leslie Groves, the head of the whole Manhattan Project. In a casual conversation, at a private dinner in Los Alamos which I attended, he said: "You realize, of course, that the main purpose of the Project is to subdue the Russians." The date of this event, March 1944, is significant. This was the time when the Russians were our allies, in the common fight against Hitler. Thousands of Russians were dying every day, holding back the German forces at Stalingrad, and giving time for the Allies to prepare for the landing in France.
Two months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in October 1945, General Groves outlined his views on the US policy on nuclear weapons in a blunt statement:
"If we were truly realistic instead of idealistic, as we appear to be (sic), we would not permit any foreign power with which we are not firmly allied, and in which we do not have absolute confidence, to make or possess atomic weapons. If such a country started to make atomic weapons we would destroy its capacity to make them before it has progressed far enough to threaten us."
Fifty-seven years later, this realism is spelled out in the NPR.
The "idealistic" sentiment lamented by General Groves was the worldwide reaction to the destruction of the two Japanese cities, a reaction of revulsion, shared by the great majority of people in the United States. From the beginning, nuclear weapons were viewed with abhorrence; a moral stand that evoked an almost universal opposition to any use of nuclear weapons; I believe this is still true today. This feeling found expression in the United Nations in the very first resolution of its General Assembly. The Charter of the United Nations was adopted in June 1945, two months before Hiroshima, and thus no provision is made for the nuclear age in the Charter. But when the General Assembly met for the first time in January 1946, the first resolution, adopted unanimously, was to set up a Commission, whose terms of reference were to:
"… proceed with the utmost dispatch and enquire into all phases of the problem, and … make specific proposals … for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction."
The United States government could not openly oppose this objective, but it tried its best to kybosh it. The campaign for the elimination of nuclear weapons began in the United States immediately after Hiroshima and was spearheaded by the scientists from the Manhattan Project. They set up working parties which studied specific proposals for the control of atomic energy in all its aspects. The outcome was the so-called Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which recommended the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority with the power to control, inspect and license all nuclear activities; it also made specific proposals, such as:
"Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty."
The Acheson-Lilienthal Report was the basis for the Baruch Plan which expounded the official stand of the US Government, and was presented to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, in June 1946.
It began in apocalyptic language:
"We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business.
Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: we must elect World Peace or World Destruction."
Fine words, strong sentiments, but alas not followed by deeds.
The Baruch Plan incorporated certain conditions to the treaty which were obviously designed to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union, such as the removal of the right of veto by the permanent members of the Security Council. And sure enough, the Baruch Plan was rejected by the Soviets and the UN Atomic Energy Commission ended in failure.
This pattern of dissembling has characterized the nuclear policy of the United States government ever since. On the one hand, the US government feels obliged to pay lip-service to the policy of nuclear disarmament leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons, bowing to the pressure of world opinion expressed in resolutions adopted year after year by large majorities of the United Nations General Assembly. This has led to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which all but four members of the United Nations are now parties. Under the terms of the NPT, the 182 non-nuclear countries have undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the five overt nuclear states have undertaken to get rid of theirs. There was some ambiguity in the formulation of the relevant Article VI of the NPT, which provided the hawks with an excuse for the retention of nuclear weapons until general and complete disarmament had been achieved. But — again under pressure of public opinion — this ambiguity was removed two years ago in a statement issued after the 2000 NPT Review Conference. This statement, signed by all five nuclear-weapon states, contains the following:
"…an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI."
Thus, the United States and the other official nuclear states — China, France, Russia and the UK — are formally and unequivocally committed to the elimination of all nuclear arsenals. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world is a legal commitment by all signatories of the NPT.
On the other hand, there is the de facto nuclear strategy of extended deterrence, which implies the indefinite existence of nuclear arsenals.
Since the end of the Cold War, the actual US nuclear strategy has been increasingly orientated towards the use of nuclear weapons, along the lines originally advocated by General Groves. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the US policy, supported by many NATO countries, envisaged the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort only; this means against an attack with nuclear arms. But the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, under the Clinton Administration, for the first time made explicit mention of the use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack with chemical or biological weapons. The current Nuclear Posture Review goes further still, it makes nuclear weapons the tool with which to keep peace in the world.
If this is the purpose of nuclear weapons, then these weapons will be needed as long as disputes are settled by recourse to military confrontations, in other words, as long as war is a recognized social institution. Such a policy is unacceptable in a civilized society on many grounds: logical, political, military, legal, and ethical. In this paper I am mainly concerned with the last two, legal and moral.
US nuclear policy is self-defeating on logical grounds. If some nations — including the most powerful militarily — say that they need nuclear weapons for their security, then such security cannot be denied to other countries which really feel insecure. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is thus the logical consequence of the US nuclear policy. The USA and its allies cannot prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries while retaining them for themselves. The policy of extended deterrence undermines the non-proliferation policy.
There is yet a further aspect of the logical argument which strikes at the very basis of deterrence. This is the assumption that both sides in a dispute think and behave rationally; that they are capable of a realistic assessment of the risks entailed in a contemplated action. This would not be the case with irrational leaders. I mentioned this earlier in relation to Hitler. Even a rational leader may behave irrationally in a war situation, facing defeat; or may be pushed into irrational action by mass hysteria, or when incited by religious fanaticism or nationalistic fervor. This is exactly the situation facing us today. Deterrence would certainly not apply to terrorists, who have no respect for the sanctity of human life.
The policy of extended deterrence is unacceptable on political grounds. It is highly discriminatory in that it allows a few nations — in practice, one nation — to usurp to themselves certain rights, such as policing the world by imposing sanctions on nuclear proliferators, or directly threatening them with military action: such action should be the prerogative of the United Nations. Indeed, it goes against the very purpose of the United Nations, an organization set up specifically for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The policy of extended deterrence also means a permanent polarization of the world, with some nations being offered protection by a powerful nuclear state; while others may be protected by another nuclear state, or have no protection at all.
The policy is not credible on military grounds in relation to terrorist attacks. As the events of September 11th have shown, a major threat to security comes from terrorist groups, a threat which includes the use of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear ones. The thousands of nuclear weapons still in the arsenals are useless against terrorists for the simple reason that terrorist groups do not usually present an identifiable target, unless the killing of thousands of innocent people is seen as collateral damage and thus acceptable. At the same time, the very existence in the world of nuclear weapons, or nuclear-weapon-grade materials, increases the threat, because these materials may be acquired by the terrorists, in one way or another.
Extended deterrence is unacceptable on legal grounds. The United States, together with 186 other nations, that is 98 per cent of the UN membership, have signed and ratified the NPT. After the clarification at the 2000 Review Conference, the situation is perfectly clear: the policy of extended deterrence, which requires the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons, is in direct breach of the legally binding Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is a sine qua non of a civilized society that nations fulfill their legal commitments and adhere to international treaties.
But above all, the nuclear deterrent is not acceptable on ethical grounds. The whole concept of nuclear deterrence is based on the belief that the threat of retaliation is real, that nuclear weapons would be used against an act of aggression; otherwise, the bluff would soon be called. George W. Bush must show convincingly that he has the kind of personality that would enable him to push the button and unleash an instrument of wholesale destruction, harming not only the alleged aggressor but mainly innocent people, and potentially imperiling the whole of our civilization. I find it terrifying to think that among the necessary qualifications for leadership is the readiness to commit an act of genocide, because this is what it amounts to in the final analysis. Furthermore, by acquiescing in this policy, not only the President, but each of us, figuratively, keeps our finger on the button; each of us is taking part in a gamble in which the survival of human civilization is at stake. We rest the security of the world on a balance of terror. In the long run this is bound to erode the ethical basis of civilization.
This erosion has probably already set in. Here I have to tread with caution, because I can only speak as a layman who has been observing events over many years. It seems to me that people cannot go on for decades living under the threat of instant annihilation, without this having an effect on their psyche. I cannot help the feeling that the increase of violence in the world — from individual mugging, to organized crime, to groups such as al-Qaeda — has some connection with the culture of violence under which we have lived during the Cold War years, and still do. I am particularly concerned about the effect on the young generation.
We all crave a world of peace, a world of equity. We all want to nurture in the young generation the "culture of peace," which we keep on proclaiming. But how can we talk about a culture of peace if that peace is predicated on the existence of weapons of mass destruction? How can we persuade the young generation to cast aside the culture of violence, when they know that it is on the threat of extreme violence that we rely for security?
I do not believe that the people of the world would accept a policy that is inherently immoral and is bound to end in catastrophe, a policy that implies the continued existence of nuclear weapons. But the resolutions for nuclear disarmament, passed every year by large majorities in the General Assembly, are completely ignored by the nuclear-weapon states, which in practice means the United States government.
In saying this, I have made a distinction between the US government and the US people, because I am convinced that the latter share with the great majority of people all over the world an abhorrence of the use of nuclear weapons.
There are groups within the US community, such as the military-industrial complex identified by President Eisenhower, with vested interests in pursuing a policy based on the continuing possession of nuclear weapons by the United States. The influence of these groups on the Administration may wax and wane, but it appears to be particularly strong in the Administration of George W. Bush, with its main characteristic of unilateralism.
The defeat of Communism in the Cold War, and the triumph of the open market economy, gave a great fillip to the capitalist system, despite its ugly faces of greed and selfishness. Profit making has become a main driving force for those groups, and protection of property a necessary upshot. The most powerful country in the world, economically, technologically, and militarily, feels the need for even greater security by seeking more protection against an attack from outside, and by the suppression — if need be, with military means — of the acquisition of greater military power by countries seen as an enemy. A ballistic missile defence system — which may include nuclear interceptors — is considered necessary to prevent any missiles reaching the territory of the USA. But even with a defence system 100 per cent effective, which is technically unlikely, the possession of a few thousand nuclear warheads is still considered necessary to deter other countries from acquiring these means of protection for themselves.
It is in the interaction with other countries that the unilateralist tendencies are so pernicious. The interests of the United States must come first and foremost. International treaties, even those already agreed to, can be ignored or unilaterally revoked, if they do not serve these interests. During the first year of the George W. Bush Administration we have seen a whole string of steps along the unilateral path: abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); refusal to sign the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention; withdrawal from the Kyoto Agreement on the Environment; opposition to the International Criminal Court; etc. etc.
These negative measures, which weaken international treaties and agreements, are accompanied by steps designed to increase the military strength of the USA. They include a considerable increase in military expenditure, particularly in the nuclear field. They include the decision not to destroy mechanically the warheads which were due for dismantlement in accordance with the START agreements. These have now been replaced by the treaty that has been signed in Moscow today, a treaty that has been hailed as a momentous step towards world peace, but is nothing of the kind. Any reduction of weapons of mass destruction is of course, greatly welcome, but in this case the reduction is illusory. The warheads withdrawn from the arsenals under the Bush-Putin treaty — over the unnecessarily long period of ten years — will be kept in storage as a reserve force, which could be quickly activated; either side having the right to withdraw from the treaty on 90 days notice.
The steps also include the development of new and greatly improved warheads, a programme that started covertly under Clinton and now continues more overtly under Bush.
In the early 1990s — after the end of the Cold War — there was a period of goodwill when both sides agreed to take measures to reduce the enormous nuclear arsenals. As part of this, the United States Government decided to halt the production of new nuclear warheads and to end nuclear testing.
There is a general assumption that new nuclear weapons cannot be developed and made militarily usable without their being tested. Hence, the great importance of the CTBT, which was signed by President Clinton, but its ratification was rejected by the then Republican majority in the Senate. Initially, this was thought to be a rather petty vengeance against Clinton, which would soon be rectified, but since then it emerged that the main reason was the perceived need for further testing of new, or modified old warheads.
The retention of a nuclear arsenal necessitates an infrastructure to ensure the safety and reliability of the warheads in the stockpile, as well as the capability to resume testing at short notice. An adequate core of scientists and engineers would be employed to carry out these tasks. This was the origin of the Stockpile Stewardship management Program which began in 1994, with a budget recently increased by the Bush Administration to $5.3 billion.
The Stewardship Program includes the task to "maintain nuclear weapon capability; develop a stockpile surveillance engineering base; demonstrate the capability to design, fabricate and certify new warheads." This brief is broad enough to allow the scientists to do almost anything as long as it does not openly entail nuclear testing and the actual production of new nuclear warheads. Considering the role which scientists played in the nuclear weapons establishments during the Cold War, it is a fair assumption that they will go to the limit of their brief.
The development of new warheads is not allowed, but this obstacle can be circumvented by taking an old weapon and introducing a number of modifications, each of which is permitted under the terms of the Program but which in the end produces a more usable weapon, although eventually it would have to be tested, to give the military people confidence in the improved product. With President Bush’s contempt for international agreements, there can be no doubt that he will authorize new nuclear testing, when he decides that this would be in the interest of the United States, as was confirmed in the opening statement to the Preparatory NPT Review Conference that was held a few weeks ago.
There are persistent rumours, reported in articles in reputable journals, that work in Los Alamos has resulted in the development of new warheads. Most of the military research in the national laboratories, Los Alamos, Livermore, Sandia, is carried out in secrecy, making it impossible to say how reliable these rumours are, but they seem credible. Certainly, there is much more activity going on in Los Alamos, with new buildings being erected, as I have seen myself during a recent visit to Los Alamos (although I did not go into the tech area). And, of course, we know that much more money has been allocated for research there.
The persistent rumours are about the development of a new nuclear warhead, of a very low yield, almost overlapping the yields of conventional high explosives, but with a shape that will give it very high penetrating power into concrete, a "bunker-bursting mini-nuke," as it has been called. The additional property ascribed to it is that it is a "clean" bomb, in the sense that the radioactive fission products are contained. This claim needs to be treated with caution; considerable doubt has been expressed about the prevention of the release of radioactivity.
But the main worry about this bomb, even if its attributed characteristics should prove to be correct, is the political impact. If it is "clean," and its explosive yield can be made so low as to be within the range of that of conventional explosives, then the distinction between the two types of weapon will become blurred. The chief characteristic of a nuclear weapon is its enormous destructive power, which classifies it as a weapon of mass destruction, unique even in comparison with the other known weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological. This has resulted in a taboo about the use of nuclear weapons in combat, a taboo that has held out since Nagasaki. But if at one end of the spectrum a nuclear bomb can be manufactured which does not differ quantitatively from ordinary explosives, the qualitative difference will also disappear, the nuclear threshold will be crossed, and nuclear weapons will gradually come to be seen as a tool of war, even though their main characteristic, of potentially the existence of the human race, will still remain. The Nuclear Posture Review makes this a real possibility; the situation has become even more dangerous.
The wording of the Nuclear Posture Review was no doubt strongly influenced by the events of September 11th. These events came as a terrible shock to the people of the United States. Having never been subject to an attack on the American Continent they suddenly found themselves vulnerable; the "splendid isolation" was breached; a near panic ensued on a mere rumour of an attack with a biological weapon.
In the campaign that I am urging, to put the nuclear issue back on the public agenda, we should make use of the very arguments and tactics employed by President Bush in the actions against terrorism. In order to be able to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda following the September 11 attacks, he had to build up a coalition of many countries for the military campaign in Afghanistan, even though the military burden was carried almost entirely by the United States. He also had to build up a moral case for the campaign, by presenting the terrorists as evil men, in contrast to the coalition who are the virtuous people.
By calling for help from other countries President Bush acknowledged the failure of his own unilateralist policy. An example of this is the event that took place today in Moscow; despite his contempt for international agreements, President Bush felt obliged to sign a new international treaty. Even though this treaty is a sham, we should exploit this in our efforts to put the elimination of nuclear weapons back on the agenda. No Man is an Island, particularly in a world which — thanks largely to the fantastic progress in technology — is becoming more and more interdependent, more and more transparent, more and more interactive. Inherent in these developments is a set of agreements, ranging from confidence-building measures to formal international treaties; from protection of the environment to the clearance of mine fields; from Interpol to the International Criminal Court; from ensuring intellectual property rights to the Declaration of Human Rights. Respect for, and strict adherence to, the terms of international agreements are at the basis of a civilized society.
Without this, anarchy and terrorism would reign, the very dangers the coalition was set up to prevent.
In line with this the world community has the right to call on the US government to take the following steps immediately:
ratify the CTBT;
retract its notice to with draw from the ABM;
reject any notion of weaponization of space;
take its nuclear weapons off alert;
adopt a no-first-use policy;
all this in preparation for the implementation of its commitment to nuclear disarmament, under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
An even stronger argument towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world should be based on the moral objections to nuclear weapons. President Bush insists that the campaign against terrorists, following the September 11th events, has a strong moral basis; a "moral crusade" he called it initially, and although this was quickly dropped, because of its unfortunate historical connotations, it is still presented as a struggle between good and evil, with the USA being on the side of the angels. But such a claim can be sustained only if the US policies and actions are demonstrably guided by ethical considerations. The hypocritical policy of preaching one thing and practicing just the opposite hardly comes under this category. The use of nuclear weapons, and even the threat of using them, is generally viewed as highly immoral; a moral stand is completely incompatible with the readiness by the President to push the nuclear button. If the United States is to insist in calling itself a leader of a campaign based on moral principles, then it should denounce any use of weapons of mass destruction; and it should implement the policy of their total abolition to which it is in any case committed legally.
A campaign for abolition, based on moral principles, will be seen as a fanciful dream by many, but I trust not by INES, an organization committed to ethical values. You will not submit to a policy which may result in the deaths of many thousands or millions of people, potentially threatening the very existence of the human species.
The situation is grim; the way things are moving is bound to lead to catastrophe. If there is a way out, even if seemingly unrealistic, it is our duty to pursue it. Arguments based on equity and morality may not cut ice with hardened politicians, but they may appeal to the common citizen. If we can bring to the notice of the general public the grave dangers inherent in the continuation of current policies, at the same time pointing out the long-term merits of policies based on equity and morality, we may succeed in putting the nuclear issue back on the agenda of public concern.
A colossal effort will be required, a sustained collective campaign by INES, Pugwash, and other kindred organizations. I hope that they will find the courage and the will to embark on this great task, to restore sanity in our policies, humanity in our actions, and a sense of belonging to the human race.
This paper has been presented by Sir Joseph Rotblat on 24 May 2002 at the occasion of the INES seminar "New Security Challenges: Global and Regional Priorities" in Bradford, UK. The seminar was organized by INES together with Scientists for Global Responsibility and the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford.
OO Click here for more information about this seminar.
OO Back to Contents
International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES)
and INES Against Proliferation (INESAP)
STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR DANGERS
May 26, 2002
India and Pakistan stand on the brink of war over Kashmir with serious dangers of nuclear war between the two countries.
We call upon the international community, through the United Nations Security Council to immediately intervene diplomatically to prevent war and with peace-keeping forces, if necessary, to ensure that neither country uses nuclear weapons under any circumstance.
In this context we express our strong dissatisfaction with the United States Nuclear Posture Review and with the United States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and the recently signed nuclear arms treaty between the United States and Russia. This treaty, reflecting the United States Nuclear Posture Review, does far too little too slowly and continues to set the example to the world that nuclear weapons are useful even for the strongest nations.
We urge the United States and Russia to return to the negotiation table to agree to deeper cuts, the irreversible destruction of dismantled warheads, and the immediate de-alerting of their nuclear arsenals.
We further urge that all five declared nuclear weapon states begin multilateral negotiations to fulfill their obligation for an "unequivocal undertaking" to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world, including those of India, Pakistan and Israel. The leadership of the United States and Russia, as well as that of the United Kingdom, France and China, is essential to achieve these ends and to present nuclear weapons from being used again.
The declaration "Statement on Nuclear Dangers" was formulated at the INES Council meeting 2002 in Bradford, UK.
OO Back to Contents
Open Letter to the President of the Russian Federation
Liberty for Grigorij Pasko
Dear Mr. President,
We turn to you, because we are very anxious as to the condemnation of the environmental journalist Grigorij Pasko. He had been condemned in December 2001 by the military court of the pacific fleet to four years of strict camp detention.
As to the background: On 25th December 2001 the military court of the Pacific fleet in Vladivostok imposed a detention of four years against the environmental journalist Pasko because of "treason" in form of espionage. For Pasko, who was already 20 months in detention, this meant other 28 months labour camps under "strict regime." The environmental journalist was arrested still in the courtroom — before the eyes of his wife — in handcuffs. Still days before the pronouncement of the judgment, considerable organizations and personalities, among them the prisoner relief organization "Amnesty International," demanded repeatedly an acquittal for the environmental activist.
The first time Grigorij Pasko had been arrested in 1997, when he returned from a journey to Japan. One had accused to him having passed on secret documents over accidents in Russian nuclear submarines to the Japanese press.
In a pronouncement of judgment of 1999 the military court of the pacific fleet explained that Pasko would have made himself guilty of espionage, but it condemned Pasko to three years liberty withdrawal because of excess of official powers.
Pasko, who had already served more than half of the punishment at the time of the pronouncement of judgment, fell under the amnesty and could leave the courtroom as a free man.
Both the lawyers of Pasko and the military public prosecutor's office had inserted appointment against the judgment.
Journalistic working of Pasko turned again and again around one topic: the ecological threat of the Pacific by the Russian Pacific fleet. Pasko made the illegal sinking of radioactive waste in the area of Vladivostok public. He stressed again and again the health dangers, which this radioactive waste meant for the population of the Russian Far East and for Japan.
The condemnation of Pasko reminds us of the reaction of the Soviet authorities after the reactor accident of Tschernobyl in the year 1986. The authorities had hushed up the atomic threat also at that time. Environmental activists, who demanded Glasnost in view of the disaster, had been pursued at that time. So in 1986 the artist Nina Kovalenko was "treated" in the psychiatry of obligation because of her protest against the reactor disaster.
As a member of the Council of Europe and of the OSZE Russia obliged itself by international law, to guarantee freedom of speech and liberty of the press. This includes the freedom of environmental information.
Before this background we urgently ask you: Do everything that stands in your power, in order to obtain the soon-possible release of the environmental journalist Grigorij Pasko!
Liberty for Grigorij Pasko!
OO Back to Contents
NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES: TEN THEMES
By David Krieger
The International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, in cooperation with Scientists for Global Responsibility and the University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies, held a seminar on "New Security Challenges: Global and Regional Priorities" at Bradford University on May 23-24, 2002. The following ten themes emerged from the seminar.
1. The new security challenges after September 11th are also the old security challenges.
One major exception is the greater awareness of the increased vulnerability of the rich nations to determined terrorists. The vulnerability itself has not changed in a major way, but the determination of terrorists to exploit the vulnerability has notched up.
2. It remains critical for the rich nations to redefine security so that it takes into account the interests of not only the rich, but also of those at the periphery.
Disparity, poverty, inequity and injustice are fertile breeding grounds for terrorism. The rich countries should be spending more of their resources to alleviate these conditions of insecurity rather than pouring their resources into military solutions.
3. Building the Castle Walls higher is a security strategy that is bound to fail.
The rich cannot build these walls high enough to protect themselves from suicidal terrorists. Missile defenses, for example, are no more than a Maginot Line in the sky that cannot protect against terrorists and will not provide security against the threats of 21st century terrorism. Terrorists will simply go under or around the Castle Walls as the Germans went around the French Maginot Line in World War II.
4. There is a greater probability that weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological) will be used against the most powerful countries.
The availability of these weapons, due to the continued reliance on them by the most powerful nations, creates a new "balance of power" that turns the strength of the powerful against themselves.
5. There is an increasing sense that international law is failing due to the strong opposition to international law solutions being demonstrated by the United States.
At a time when international law and international cooperation are more needed than ever to achieve greater security, the United States is failing in its leadership.
6. From a regional perspective, both Europe and Russia are failing to demonstrate a meaningful restraint on US actions subverting international law.
In this sense, they are failing in their own leadership and are making themselves potential accomplices in crime under international law.
7. The international system is not doing very well in implementing nonviolent methods of conflict resolution.
One reason for this is continued reliance by the most powerful countries on military solutions to conflict. The United States alone has raised its military budget by nearly $100 billion since Bush became president.
8. There is a need to strengthen and empower international institutions to act even in the light of uncertainty.
Their actions, however, must reasonable and legitimate, taking into account principles such as right intention, precautionary principle, last resort, proportionality, consistency and right authority.
9. There is a critical need to separate reality from illusion regarding security.
The major sources of media continue to serve power and the status quo and fail to provide adequate perspective on key issues related to peace and security.
10. There is a continuing need to activate public opinion for global and humanitarian interests.
This means that the independent voices for peace, justice, development and sustainability of civil society organizations are of critical importance in providing alternative perspectives to those of governments and the mass media on issues of peace and security.
David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Deputy Chair of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility
OO Back to Contents
Reiner Braun leaves the INES office
After more than ten years work for INES, Reiner Braun left office by 31 May of this year to accept a job in the pharmaceutical industry. Reiner was one of the founding members of INES in 1991 and acted as a managing director from the beginning. He was head of the Dortmund office, contributed to the organization of three major conferences, did a good deal of the fund raising, represented INES at many occasions, was the driving force behind many of the INES activities and was initiator and manager of several INES projects. The sustainability database, the Nepal and Kaliningrad projects and the Africa project are only a few examples of the last years. We thank him for all this work.
After ten years he felt that a change in his life was necessary. He will not be completely lost for INES since he will be member of the Executive Committee and keep control of some of his favorite projects. We may hope that he can combine this work with a fruitful career in his new position.
The managing of INES will be continued by Nicola Hellmich, who was a staff member of the Dortmund office up till now. Nicola has experience in the organization of meetings and was involved in several INES projects. It is difficult to imagine how somebody can replace Reiner and his style, but we are confident that she will manage.
OO Back to Contents
Demands for a peaceful and sustainable development in Africa
As a part of the INES Africa project "Peace at the Great Lakes," a small conference was held at Mülheim, Germany. Among the 35 participants were representatives of several African regions. The Africa project foresees more conferences, one in Europe and a bigger one in an African country in 2003. Fund raising for this conference is still the great problem.
Final declaration of the Mülheim Conference, 2 March 2002
Also for Africa peace and sustainability are the most serious aspirations.
The political, social, economic and ecological problems in Africa are of a hardly comprehensible dimension and intensity. The description of the reality is often beyond human comprehension. Nevertheless, the analysis of the problems remains to be the prerequisite for the development of conflict solution strategies and social alternative conceptions. National efforts alone are insufficient for a solution of the problems.
The capital and power interests of the individual protagonists must be made public and it must be clarified that there are often no ethnic reasons but that social conflicts and power maintenance are at stake. The social dimension of the enormous exploitation and impoverishment of the people must be recognized.
The prerequisite of a successful solution strategy is the rejection of neo liberal politics and economy. A "Global Deal" is indispensable. This global deal must be the focal point of attention for the World Summit "Sustainable Development" in Johannesburg. Only if this Global Deal contains concrete and practical instructions for the implementation of the principles, a solution for the situation in Africa can be found.
The objectives and responsibilities to be contained in this Global Deal should be developed in partnership with states and with the civil society in all regions. We believe that in order to be effective, the Global Deal must include the following elements:
Africa is not a "lost continent"
The protagonists for the Global Deal are available — also in Africa. These are the non-government organizations, the socially dedicated, the refugees and the women. Their common action can put the Global Deal on the agenda.
The first world has to take at least these three steps:
The chance lies in the crisis!
The chance can be used. Africa is not a "lost continent."
Protest against abuse
The participants of the conference in Mülheim protest decisively against the sexual abuse of refugee children in Africa. They demand the complete and immediate clarification of this monstrous scandal of abuse of dependents and minors by employees of some forty development organizations.
What a disgusting cynicism! The children concerned are in a desperate situation. They have the choice between either ruin or starvation or selling themselves. We demand the immediate withdrawal of all employees of development organizations being under suspicion. An international commission must be installed to check the activities of all international organizations in Africa, with the participation of non-governmental organizations and the people concerned in the African countries.
OO Back to Contents
Report on the
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)
8-19 April 2002, New York
David Hay-Edie, International Peace Bureau Disarmament Coordinator
The First Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference was held in New York from 8th to 19th April 2002. This was an initial step in the review process to 2005. As expected, virtually no progress was made towards nuclear disarmament, despite the "unequivocal undertaking" of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) in the 2000 Review Conference to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
There was no negotiated outcome: the Chairman issued a report on his own responsibility. The PrepCom attracted very little media publicity. This was a pity as it took place against the dangerous background of the US Nuclear Posture Review which threatens to undermine the NPT with a new generation of nuclear weapons. Concerns about the threats to the NPT were voiced by many states and NGOs present. It will be important therefore to keep up the pressure on the nuclear weapons states in the run-up to next year’s PrepCom, to be held in Geneva next Spring.
Discussion amongst States Parties
As usual, the NGOs were excluded from all but the opening and closing Plenary discussion. (They were able however to convey their views effectively in one Plenary session, and in meetings in the margins — see below). The nuclear weapons states (NWS) made predictable defenses of their records. It was clear though from many states’ remarks in the public sessions, and from reports of their private discussions, that there is deep frustration amongst many non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) at the NWS performance. A repeated theme, notably from the New Agenda Coalition states, was that the deal made at the time of the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT — agreement to this extension by the NNWS on the condition that the NWS would embark on nuclear disarmament — was not being honoured. There was no "carte blanche" for NWS’ continuous ownership of nuclear weapons. Several countries (Peru, Brazil etc) pointed out that, post 11 September, the best means to avoid nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands is to get rid of them. Many states stressed that while US / Russian bilateral reductions in strategic arsenals are welcome, especially if irreversible and in treaty form, the real need is for multilateral nuclear disarmament discussions to start at the Conference on Disarmament. There were many references to the need to reinforce IAEA safeguards and controls over transport of nuclear material. Many countries called for an extension of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) to the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia.
Two themes caused heated discussions and were only resolved with difficulty. The first was the issue of reporting by states parties on steps taken to implement the NPT. The case for some sort of standardised procedure, advocated by a number of countries led by Canada, (and supported by NGOs) was resisted by the NWS, notably the US which want reporting left to the determination of individual states parties. The Chairman’s Summary reflects the compromise reached: it refers to the differing views on the matter. As more thorough reporting is an important means to oblige states parties to be more transparent and accountable for their action (or non-action) this is an important issue which will be returned to in informal consultations before the next Prep Com. The other difficulty in discussions — reflecting the deep concern of Arab states at Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons and non-adherence to the NPT — concerned action taken by states parties to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East and realization of the goals of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. This was resolved by vague language in the Chairman’s summary referring to the need for states parties and "other interested states" to report on this issue to the Chairmen of the coming PrepComs and the President of the 2005 Review Conference.
These took two main forms. The first was a whole morning of prepared statements from 14 NGO representatives, on topics such as "The Rule of Law, the NPT, and Global Security" (Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear policy; Institute for Energy and Environmental Research); "Nuclear Arsenals, Missiles, and Missile Defense and Space Weaponisation" (INESAP); and "NGO Recommendations to the 2002 NPT PrepCom" (IPPNW; Medical Association for the Prevention of Nuclear War). Several government delegations subsequently complimented NGOs on the expertise and professionalism of these contributions, even contrasting them favourably with some governmental statements.
The second was a series of NGO meetings in the margins, open also to government delegations. These included, inter alia: a Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) consultation, an NGO exchange with delegations, and a session by Greenpeace on US plans to adapt the US base at Thule, Greenland, for their Missile Defense programme. These sessions — and the wealth of NGO literature available — exposed delegations to the vigour and variety of NGO positions on NPT issues. Senator Roche (MPI) made an impassioned plea to resist the reinforced commitment to nuclear doctrine inherent in the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), with its proposed addition of nuclear "war fighting capacity" (bunker busting missiles) to existing nuclear deterrence doctrines. Another recurrent theme — echoed by many government delegations — was deep concern that the NPR, by threatening pre-emptive nuclear first use against non-nuclear states, is undermining the Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) given by the NWS in the UN Security Council in 1995 as part of the NPT extension package. NGOs and many states called for clearly legally binding NSAs and No First Use declarations by all NWS. The First Use option (and nuclear weapons in general) was denounced as profoundly immoral by the Holy See.
Conclusion / Points for lobbying
The NPT process risks being undermined by the hypocrisy of the NWS when — despite the modernisation of their arsenals (vertical proliferation), retention of nuclear deterrence, and envisaged US introduction of new nuclear doctrines/ weapons systems (Nuclear Posture Review), — they are recorded in the Chairman’s Summary as having " …informed States Parties of their … reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and that new nuclear weapons systems are not being developed." This PrepCom will at least have served to (a) bring civil society’s concerns to the attention of states parties (though inadequate media inattention is a problem); and (b) enable the NNWS, spurred on by the MPI and New Agenda Coalition, to remind the NWS of the current dangers and of their obligations for serious nuclear disarmament under the NPT.
Points for lobbying:
India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba should adhere to the NPT, thus ensuring universal membership.
Modernisation of nuclear arsenals is inconsistent with nuclear weapons states’ NPT commitments to nuclear disarmament. US development of new generations of nuclear weapons at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) and France’s similar actions at its laser facility at Projet Megajoule are inconsistent with the NPT. New "mininukes" and the accompanying doctrines must be abandoned.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) must be brought into force as a crucial adjunct to the NPT; those states which have not yet signed (notably India and Pakistan, or ratified (notably US and Israel), should do so. In the meantime there must be no breach of the moratorium on testing. Assurances from the US and UK on their intentions at the Nevada test site are needed.
The US Missile Defense programme, which will entail a new arms race and space weaponisation, must be abandoned. The US should uphold the ABM Treaty.
A UN Conference on Nuclear Dangers, as advocated by Kofi Annan, should be held to consider practical measures to achieve nuclear disarmament, a calendar of implementation and appropriate means of verification.
Negotiations should begin as soon as possible at the CD on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (PAROS) and Nuclear Disarmament.
Agreements between the US and Russia on strategic arsenal reductions should be embodied in a treaty framework and the reductions made irreversible.
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: www.wagingpeace.org
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research: www.ieer.org
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) — Reaching Critical Will: www.reachingcriticalwill.org
Middle Powers Initiative: www.middlepowers.org
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy: www.lcnp.org
International Network of Engineers and Scientists against Proliferation (INESAP): www.inesap.org
Western States Legal Foundation: www.wslfweb.org
OO Back to Contents
The INES Special Projects Fund
In 1998 the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation established the "INES Special Projects Fund." We want to remind you of the existence of this fund. Members of INES and of INES member organizations may apply for a remittance of up to $500 from this fund, in order to get projects — which are in accord with the intentions of INES — through a difficult time (complementary critical edge funding). The money may be spent for publication of articles or books, for traveling etc.
Applications should contain a short explanation and may be sent to:
Armin Tenner, E-mail: ;
or the INES office, Nicola Hellmich, E-mail: .
OO Back to Contents
The Restoration of the Earth, the Essential Work of the 21st Century
Concluding Declaration and Call to Action from the
Restore the Earth! Conference
held at Findhorn, Scotland in April 2002 under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Drawn together by a common concern for the future of our planet, for humanity and for all other species, over 200 delegates from 35 countries shared experiences, knowledge and pain at what is happening in the world today. We affirmed the need for urgent action to reverse the accelerating process of environmental degradation which is under way. We also recognised the need for a positive vision for the future, which will ensure the wellbeing of humanity and all other species. To this end, we shared our insights, strengths, passion and commitment to making a positive difference — to help direct human cultures towards the revitalisation of the Earth.
On the basis of our discussions, the conference concluded with a declaration of the 21st century as being the Century of Restoring the Earth.
Principles and Objectives
Sustainable development, which is the focus of much international attention (including the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development), depends, by necessity, on sustainable ecosystems. Ecological restoration is the key to returning the planet’s degraded and fragmented ecosystems to their natural state of balance and health — the only condition which is truly sustainable.
The restoration of the Earth also involves the reestablishment of a viable relationship between people and Nature — one which will provide for the needs of all humanity, including pure water, clean air, healthy food and the fulfillment of our personal potential, without endangering the wellbeing and future prospects of both humans and all other species.
The restoration of the Earth, based on existing projects which demonstrate best practice, will provide numerous benefits to society. These include: the regeneration of local economies, the creation of new markets for ecological goods and services, enhanced environmental and international security; and the establishment of sustainable livelihoods, through which social justice and the elimination of poverty can be achieved.
Strategic Call to Action — The Need for Action from Governments
As the state of the global environment continues to rapidly deteriorate, the need for action from governments to reverse this has never been more urgent. There is also a clear need for a bold and positive vision to address the serious issues we face. The restoration of the Earth offers such a vision, and also, through the experience of existing restoration projects, provides the basis of skills and knowledge to put this vision into practice.
To provide a positive vision of hope for the future, and to achieve the benefits which restoration can bring to society, the conference issued the following strategic call to action to governments, international institutions (including UNEP), and civil society:
To declare the 21st century the Century of Restoring the Earth, adopting such a declaration at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. This declaration will offer a positive vision for the next 100 years, and provide a rallying call which can unite all peoples and nations behind the first shared task of all humanity — returning our planet to full health, ecological balance and abundance.
To implement their existing commitments to the restoration of biodiversity under the Convention on Biological Diversity.
To establish, financially and institutionally, an Earth Restoration Programme, providing financial, volunteer and other assistance to locally-based and managed restoration projects around the world. This programme would contribute directly to environmental security, economic and social development, and local economic regeneration; promote education at all levels; and link to other relevant sustainable development activities.
To utilise existing governmental and intergovernmental infrastructure and resources, (including military) for practical restoration activities.
Notable precedents include:
the US Army Corps of Engineers / Florida Everglades;
the Indian Army / extensive tree planting; the Angolan Air Force / wildlife reintroduction;
the UK RAF/ sea eagle airlifts.
To implement the recommendations in the Earth Charter regarding ecological restoration.
Call to Action on specific Restoration Initiatives:
A number of practical restoration projects and initiatives were launched during the conference, as part of the establishment of an Earth Restoration Network. The conference concluded with a call for action from the relevant governments, agencies and other organisations to implement the following:
The development of the Forest Restoration Information Service, based at UNEPWCMC in England.
The Kissama Foundation’s Operation Noah’s Ark — for the rehabilitation of Angola’s National Parks, including the reintroduction of large mammals to them.
The North Woods Wildlands Project for the restoration and protection of wild forest in the states of Maine, New England, Vennont and New York in the USA.
The restoration of the Caledonian Forest in the north-central Highlands of Scotland.
The restoration of Tropical Dry Evergreen Forest in the state of Tamil Nadu in India.
The restoration of Lake Pedder in the heart of the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area in Australia.
The El Quemado project for the restoration of sub-Antarctic Forest in Tierra del Fuego, Argentina.
The control and eradication of invasive, non-native plant species in the Northeast of Scotland.
Restoring the Earth, The Park, Findhorn Bay, Forres 1V36 3TZ, Scotland.
E-mail: , Web: www.restore-earth.org
OO Back to Contents
8th FECS Conference on Chemistry and the Environment:
Chemistry for a Sustaining World
Athens, Greece, 31 August to 4 September 2002
Conference website: www.scientificjournals.com/espr/fecs/8thConf.2002
Organized by the University of Athens, Department of Chemistry
To fulfill its part in sustainable World development, chemistry is changing. This ‘greening’ of chemistry involves two main thrusts. First, production, use and disposal of hazardous chemicals are being reduced and where possible eliminated. This must, however, be achieved whilst maintaining or improving the quality of human life, the natural environment and industrial competitiveness. Second, the environmental impact of anthropogenic chemicals is being studied so that it may be better understood, monitored and controlled.
Research is continuing to support these goals. New synthetic pathways are being developed using renewable feedstocks, alternative solvents, catalysts and reaction conditions to increase energy and atom efficiency and reduce waste. Simultaneously the toxicology, metabolism and biogeochemical cycling of environmental contaminants and pollutants are being elucidated.
Although sustainability in chemistry has become established in many parts of the industry, there is still a lack of general awareness amongst academics, industrialists, regulators and the media.
The aim of this conference is to bring together scientists from universities, industry and governments
to discuss and promulgate the current state of knowledge, latest research findings and likely future developments in all aspects of chemistry in the environment;
to point the way to an integrated approach to chemistry for a sustainable and sustaining world in the twenty-first century.
The conference will include invited plenary lectures from world authorities, parallel sessions of oral presentations of submitted papers arranged to cater for both specialist and generalist participants, dedicated workshops and exhibitions of commercial laboratory and field equipment.
A special session will be devoted to the 2004 Olympic Games and its potential impact on the city of Athens.
Air Quality and Exposure, Hartmut Frank, Herman van Langenhove;
Water and Sediment Quality and Treatment, Fritz Frimmel, Maria Teresa Vasconcelos;
Soil Quality and Remediation, Toomas Tenno, Costas Michael;
Anthropogenic Chemistry, Valery S. Petrosyan, John Holder;
Environmental Management, Allan Astrup Jensen, Sergio Facchetti;
Education in Environmental Chemistry, Uri Zoller, Miltiades I. Karayannis;
Olympic Games and the Environment, Panayotis Siskos, Ramon Mestres;
Conservation of Ancient Monuments, Luciano Morselli, Nikos Katsanos.
Online by the website or by using the pre-registration form.
Panayotis A. Siskos
Panepistimiopolis-Zographon Athens 1.5771, Greece
OO Back to Contents
International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts
23rd Summer Course Trento — ITALY 3-13 August, 2002
Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs: Real Threats and Virtual Myths
ISODARCO has been organizing residential courses on global security since 1966. The courses are intended for people already having a professional interest in the problems of disarmament and conflicts, or for those who would like to play a more active and technically competent role in this field. The courses have an interdisciplinary nature, and their subject matters extend from the technical and scientific side of the problems to their sociological and political implications. Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs have given rise to a lively discussion in political and military circles in the last few years. Issues of major importance are: the relation between computers and regional defense; the threat of "cyberterrorism" as well as "cyberwar;" emerging forms of network organization and how information technology supports them; the impact of information technology developments in military doctrine and organization of military forces. Of comparable importance is the issue of the possible implications on civil society and civil liberties possibly brought about by counter-measures to cyberwar and netwar.
Ralf Bendrath, Free University of Berlin; Dmitry Chereshkin, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; Simon Davies, London School of Economics and Political Science; Neil Fisher, Independent Information Assurance Consultant, London; Seymour Goodman, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA; Ahmed S. Hashim, Naval War College, New Port, (USA); Li Hua Institute for Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, Beijing; Alexander Kaffka, The Avenue Magazine, Moscow; Andrey Krutskikh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow; Stephanie Lanz, Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, Arlington, USA; Armando Martinez, New School University, NewYork; Olivier Minkwitz, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, Germany; Peter G. Neumann, SRI International, Menlo Park, USA; Kevin A. O’Brien, RAND Europe, Cambridge, UK; Eric Roberts, Stanford University, CA, USA; Georg Schoefbaenker, Austrian Information Center for Security Policy & Arms Control, Linz; Vitaly N. Tsygichko, Russian Academy Sciences, Moscow; Moshe Y. Vardi, Rice University, Houston, USA; Adolfo Villafiorita, ITC-irst, Trento, Italy; Cindy Williams, MIT, Cambridge, USA.
Applications should be submitted with the following information that is compulsory also for those who have previously attended:
Full name, date and place of birth, gender, and full address (including e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers if available). Present nationality. Degree and / or other academic qualifications. Present professional activities and work address. Publication list and field of interest. In lieu of publications, a letter of recommendation from a professor or a scholar in the field. No special application form is required.
Applications should arrive not later than June 3, 2002 and should be addressed to the Director of the School:
Prof. Carlo Schaerf
Department of Physics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"
Via della Ricerca Scientifica 1, I-00133 Rome, Italy
The ISODARCO web page www.isodarco.it contains additional information.
OO Back to Contents
The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has prepared a briefing book entitled
The Status of Nuclear Disarmament
that will be delivered to the delegates of the NPT Prep Com. The book highlights significant events since the 2000 NPT Review Conference in relation to the five points of the Foundation’s Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity and All Life. The book is available in the Member’s Area of the Foundation’s website to download in pdf format:
The briefing book can also be ordered by mail for $5.00 per copy + $1.00 Shipping/Handling per copy.
Carah Lynn Ong
Director of Research and Publications
The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 1
Santa Barbara, California, 93108-2794 USA
Websites: www.wagingpeace.org, www.nuclearfiles.org, www.mbmd.org
To become a free on-line participating member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, visit the website:
OO Back to Contents
Science and Environmental Health Network (SEHN)
It is comforting to know that there are other organizations and networks in the world that carry the same principles and objectives as INES. One of these networks is SEHN; we are happy to publish this short description of its activities.
The Science and Environmental Health Network is an intellectual catalyst for the environmental movement. It is a practical think tank, harnessing the best ideas and science to the cause of protecting public health and the environment. Although it participates in organizing campaigns, its major contributions are ideas in the form of speeches, books, articles, consultations, and conferences. SEHN is a 501(c)(3) organization.
SEHN engages a broad range of constituencies and groups in the effective application of scientific enterprise to restore and protect the health of the Earth and its peoples. SEHN’s goals are threefold:
In 1993 a significant contingent of the environmental movement began meeting regularly to respond to increasingly virulent attacks on the environmental agenda. These leaders also realized that it was becoming difficult to satisfy the increasing demand for scientific expertise in the environmental community. At the same time, scientists who wished to do public service had few formal links with groups that might direct their attention to areas where research might be beneficial.
These discussions resulted in the formation, in 1994, of the Science and Environmental Health Network and its initial funding in 1995. It is to date the only forum in which scientists can come together with diverse communities for the purpose of redirecting the scientific enterprise toward the protection of the environment and public health.
Since 1998, SEHN has been the leading proponent in the United States of the precautionary principle as a sound basis for environmental and public health policy. The principle is summarized this way in SEHN’s 1998 Wingspread Statement: "When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically." As a result of SEHN’s work, the precautionary principle has been incorporated into treaties as an enforceable measure and a number of communities and regions are rethinking their environmental and public health policies. The December 9, 2001, New York Times Magazine listed and described the precautionary principle as one of the influential ideas of 2001.
SEHN is a virtual organization, with a small staff working across North America.
OO Back to Contents
The INES Executive Committee 2002
On May 27th, at its Bradford meeting, the INES Council elected the following Executive Committee:
OO Back to Contents