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1. Non Governmental Organisations' achievements to ban the atomic bomb and the role of scientists and engineers

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Since the first nuclear bombs exploded in 1945 scientists and engineers got involved in activities with the goal to free the world of the atomic bomb. Especially physicists felt their responsibility to ban this weapon of mass destruction that was made possible due to the results of nuclear physics. Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) were able to influence the politics of nuclear weapon states which are still extremely resistant against any concrete measures towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Over several decades the Pugwash Conferences for Science and World Affairs played a major role and was honoured together with its co-founder Prof. Joseph Rotblat with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995. Some more recent NGO achievements will be described here with an emphasis on the role of scientists and engineers in these.

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1. The World Court Project was started by IPPNW and IALANA and ipb in May 1992 in Geneva. Four years later, this project reached ist goal. On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice in The Hague announced ist Advisory Opinion on the "Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons". Accordingly, nuclear weapons need to be regarded generally illegal. Under the current international and humanitarian law, all states have the obligation to negotiate in good faith and bring to an early conclusion a treaty that bans all nuclear weapons.

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2. In 1993, the International Coalition for a nuclear-weapon-free world (NWFW) was formed by IALANA, INESAP, ipb and IPPNW. The focus was put on the NPT Review and Extension Conference 1995. On this occasion, INESAP published the report "Beyond the NPT - a NWFW" which was co-authored by 50 scientists and engineers form 17 countries. During the NPT conference, INES participated in the foundation of the international network Abolition 2000 with the goal of binding declarations for the abolition of nuclear weapons from all states by the year 2000. By November 1999, this network has grown to 1377 organizations in 89 countries who have endorsed the Abolition 2000 statement.

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3. A Model Nuclear Weapons Convention was drafted by a group of scientists and disarmament experts led by LCNP and INESAP. The first draft was presented in April 1997 in New York. It was submitted to the UN by Costa Rica in October 1997 and became an official UN document with the number A/C.1/52/7. A second draft was released together with a commentary and responses in April 1999.

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4. The Middle Powers Initiative was proposed by former Canadian ambassador Douglas Roche and formed by IALANA, ipb, INES, IPPNW, NAPF, PGA and SWF in March 1998. Three months later, eight governments launched the New Agenda Coalition. Both follow the same goal of putting pressure from middle power states to the nuclear weapons states towards serious nuclear disarmament.

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Where do we stand now? What should we do?

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Before looking ahead, a closer look at the role of scientists and engineers in establishing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should help to draw lessons for a Nuclear Weapons Convention and identify the most urgent and success-promising activity that should be undertaken by scientists and engineers in the next couple of years towards this goal.

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2. Role of scientists and engineers in establishing a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

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The parallel development of the global verification system and the political conditions for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is illustrated in the Table 1. Obviously, there were simultaneous developments. However, it is very remarkable that there were phases when the political process was in a deadlock and, nevertheless, scientific activities were carried on even with a political mandate. For some years, the scientific activities kept up the momentum and prepared the ground for political progress. This was clearly the case with the Geneva Group of Experts (1958-1960) as well as with the Group of Scientific Experts (since 1976) which formed the main basis for continuity for almost two decades until the CTBT negotiations started in 1993.

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Table 1: Parallel development of the global verification system and the political conditions for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

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Lessons from the Geneva Group of Experts (1958-1960):

• For the first time, scientists were given an independent role in negotiating security issues.
• Scientists negotiated before diplomats were able to negotiate.
• Scientists prepared the ground (verification, circumvention).
• Comprehensive treaty anticipated, limited achieved.

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Lessons from the Group of Scientific Experts (since 1976)

• The GSE had a political mandate.
• Scientific members were appointed by governments.
• Progress was not at all times connected to political negotiations.
• At times, the GSE established a substitute for negotiations.
• International coordination of national technical means was started.
• The work was based on a lasting common agenda.
• The work was supported by infrastructure financed through states.
• The GSE created a common understanding and furthered knowledge.

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As a conclusion from these experiences and in view of the current deadlock in nuclear disarmament one can dare the conclusion that scientists and engineers may have the chance to make a significant difference in preparing the ground for a political breakthrough towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. It makes sense to start scientifically based work early and even when the comprehensive goal appears to be remote. The lessons learnt in the experience of the 4 decades lasting developments leading to the CTBT are encouraging and need to be carefully taken into account.

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3. Proposals for future work of nuclear scientists towards global elimination of nuclear weapons

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Two different but interconnected areas are described here which nuclear scientists could concentrate their efforts on. The global elimination of nuclear weapons is the more visionary goal that basically builds on a more imminent universal and comprehensive control of nuclear-weapons-usable materials. Nevertheless, it makes sense to initiate internationally coordinated and technically detailed scientific work on both areas as soon as possible. Therefore, appropriate proposals are made in this section for both areas.

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3.1 Nuclear-weapons material cut-off

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In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva reached consensus on a mandate to negotiate a Fissile Material Treaty (Cut-off). Since then, absolutely no progress was made. In August 1998, the Ad Hoc Committee met for the first time but did not achieve much. In 1999, the Ad Hoc Committee did not meet at all. Since the negotiations on the CTBT were concluded in 1996, the CD found itself most of the time in a deadlock. Other ways for progress on this issue are required.

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Other international fora might play a role in strengthening fissile material controls. One important example is the conclusion of the International guidelines for the management of plutonium which was reached in December 1997.

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It is suggested here that scientists could establish an independent expert working group on technical issues of nuclear-weapons-usable materials, preferably mandated by the CD in Geneva. The goal of this group would encompass the following:

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1. Set-up national balances of weapons-usable materials and combine these to form a global balance.
2. Compare different scopes for an international agreement on nuclear-weapons-usable materials and list the pros and cons of more or less comprehensive agreements.
3. Outline a Comprehensive Cut-off Convention.
4. Suggest steps for an incremental approach.
5. Develop, describe and possibly demonstrate reconstruction of past production (nuclear archaeology).
6. Develop, describe and possibly demonstrate verification, especially for clandestine activities (e.g. krypton-85).

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3.2 Global elimination of nuclear weapons

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In 2000, the CD may pick up the NATO-5 proposal for a working group to study ways and means of establishing an exchange of information and views on nuclear disarmament. This would be an ideal opportunity for scientists to offer their expertise and to suggest the creation of an expert working group on verification of complete nuclear disarmament. Even without an agreement on formal political discussions on nuclear disarmament, scientists could offer to establish this working group. It would address the following critical issues:

1. Verification of dismantlement of all nuclear weapons.
2. Detection of nuclear weapons hiding.
3. Detection of nuclear-weapons-usable material hiding.
4. Detection of diversion of nuclear-weapons-usable material.
5. Detection of clandestine production of nuclear weapons.
6. Verification of non-development of nuclear weapons (beyond the scope of the CTBT).

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Already in April 1998, INESAP proposes to start a study process, tentatively entitled "Beyond technical verification: Transparency, verification, and preventive control for the Nuclear Weapons Convention". The main purpose of this proposed study would be to increase awareness concerning the scientific-technological constraints and boundary conditions for a way leading to a nuclear-weapon-free world. It would illuminate the verification needs and limits and it would stress especially the importance of transparency. Recommended is a comprehensive approach which carries the Nuclear Weapons Convention as the central element.

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